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Aída García, Board Member, NGO CEDAL (interviewed on January 19, 2001).
Narda Henríquez, Professor, Social Sciences and Gender Studies Program, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (interviewed on May 3, 2000).
Rosa Landavery, Central nacional de mujeres de sectores populares del Perú « Micaela Bastidas », Former leader of the Comisión nacional de comedores (interviewed on February 15, 2001).
Yolanda Mariluz, Advisor to the central district office of the collective kitchens in Independencia, former interim President of the first Junta directiva of the Federación de mujeres organizadas en centrales de comedores populares autogestionarios y afines de Lima y Callao (interviewed on April 19, 2001).
Diana Miloslavich, Professional staff, Municipal Government Advisory Program, NGO Centro de la Mujer Peruana Flora Tristan and Member of Movimiento Amplio de Mujeres (interviewed on May 30, 2001).
Cecilia Olea, President of the Board of Directors, Centro de la Mujer Peruana Flora Tristan (interviewed on July 5, 2000 and April 25, 2001).
Rocío Palomino, Consultant, and former advisor to the Comisión Nacional de Comedores while employed by the non-governmental organization CESIP (interviewed on February 13, 2001).
Patricia Sanabria, Professional staff, Human Rights Program, NGO Movimiento Manuela Ramos (interviewed on February 14, 2000).
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Notes

Introduction

1. Douglas Chalmers defines the politicization of the State in Latin America as when “political institutions are considered tentative and are viewed instrumentally, not as permanent fixtures. Many problems that might be resolved by reference to a fixed set of procedures or laws are likely to be dealt with purely politically, subject to resolution only through a clash of forces. Policy-making institutions are themselves subject to active political questioning and conflict, and their reconstruction is viewed not as much as a violation of basic principles but as the outcome of a particularly important confrontation” (Chalmers 1977, 24).


3. For a good critique of gender essentialism, see among others Fuss 1989, 140.

4. Stetson and Mazur define “State feminism” as the contribution of the State to “the formation of feminist policy and increas[ing] the access of women’s movement activists to the political process” (Stetson and Mazur 1995, 272). State feminism is typically but not necessarily the product of the activities of state structures specifically created for such purposes. See also Rai and Lievesley 1996; Randall and Waylen 1998; and Lovenduski 2005.

5. In Latin America, political rights like the right to vote were sometimes granted to women under nondemocratic regimes such as in Peru in 1955. Many social rights were granted by Cuba’s socialist regime. The most in-depth work on State feminism in democratic states has focused on Europe, North America, and Australia. See for example Lovenduski 2005.

6. These movements had varying importance at the local or regional level. For a discussion of peasant women’s movements, see among others Radcliffe 1993 and Francke 1990. Absent from my study is also the case of women in the left-wing guerillas such as the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) or the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement-MRTA). For an interesting analysis of their role and motivations see among others Coral 1998.
Chapter 1

1. Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre devoted his life to APRA activism and signed the new Peruvian Constitution on his death bed in 1979.

2. Alan García, also a gifted orator, won the presidency in 1985. In 2006, he garnered 52.6% of the second round vote and was reelected as president.

3. The new APRA government elected in 2006 is generally pursuing neoliberal reform.

4. A “radial” conceptual definition draws upon different sociological dimensions (e.g., economic, political) to define a concept while recognizing that a single manifestation of the concept will likely not equally or adequately cover these different dimensions. See Weyland 2001.

5. Works that do address these issues: Wolfe 1994, Macpherson 2003, and on Eva Perón in Argentina’s populism and her legacy, see Taylor 1979; Fraser and Navarro 1982; and Auyero 2000. A forthcoming volume edited by Kampwirth presents for the first time a set of comparative case studies of gender and populism in Latin America (Kampwirth 2010).

6. The conditions leading to the consolidation of new democratic regimes are the subject of much theoretical and empirical research. Democratic consolidation is generally said to exist when there is: 1.) consensus on the part of all political actors to abide by the rules defining a political democracy; 2.) an actual belief among these actors in the value of democracy as the most appropriate form of governance; and 3.) genuine respect among these actors for, and promotion of, the rule of law as enshrined in a constitution (Linz and Stepan 1996). For a critical discussion of the notion of democratic consolidation, see Brachet-Marquez 1997. For a discussion of the proliferation of different democratic regime sub-types see O’Donnell 1994; Collier and Levitsky 1997; O’Donnell 1999b and Levitsky and Way 2002.

7. For another interesting piece on this subject, see Blofield 2006.

Chapter 2

1. Lynch reminds us that neither the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) Party, nor the Acción Popular (AP) Party, the two most important populist parties, called for the granting of political rights for the illiterate, which formed the majority of the population up to the late 1970s. It was only in 1978 that both parties joined the call of left-wing parties for universal suffrage. In Lynch 1999, 103.

2. This label was adopted by some Peruvian scholars and analysts to describe the Fujimori regime, acknowledging the uniqueness of its characteristics combining democratic and authoritarian elements. See among others Cotler and Grompone 2000, Rospiglioni 1995.

3. The Left won a third of the 100 seats of the Constituent Assembly. However, the APRA and the PPC agreed to cooperate, which allowed them
to control the Assembly. See Lynch 1999 and Mauceri 1997, among others.


5. Annual inflation rate was close to 100 percent in the last years of the Belaúnde government. In Contreras and Cueto 1999, 285.

6. García decided that Peru would allocate only the equivalent of ten percent of export revenues as debt repayment, whereas the debt was worth about 362 percent of Peru’s exports at that time. In Cotler 1995b, 126.

7. According to surveys reported in Cotler 1995b, García’s rate of popular support went as high as 94 percent in the first months of his rule. In Cotler 1995b, 127.

8. The proportion of the economically active population working in the informal sector grew steadily from 32.8 percent in 1981 to 45.7 percent in 1990 (Roberts 1998, 240). Moreover, between 1985 and 1990, workers’ average salary in the formal sector lost 50 percent of its value (Guerra 1995, 443).

9. The political independent model also implies the formation of a “movement” as a flexible group of supporters willing to promote the leader (Cotler 1995b).

10. At the Senate, FREDEMO held 32 percent of the seats, the APRA 25 percent, Cambio 90 22 percent, Izquierda Unida ten percent, Izquierda Socialista five percent; at the House of Representatives, FREDEMO held 30 percent, the APRA 25 percent, Cambio 90 17 percent, IU ten percent, Izquierda Socialista five percent, and seven percent of the seats were filled with Independents (Tuesta Soldevilla 2001).

11. It is a matter of debate whether Fujimori and the Military had agreed on the coup much longer before it was carried out, and therefore the use of the term “delay” is not meant to be understood as necessarily intentional. Indeed, Kenney argues that Fujimori had to convince the military not to carry the coup before his assuming power in July 1990 (Kenney 2004, 248). In any case, the explanations given for the “delay” are useful to understand the context within which the decision to carry the coup was made.

12. The label “political movements,” in contrast to political “parties,” was increasingly used to describe the rise of numerous political groupings that formed for specific elections, headed by and composed by political outsiders. These movements were made up of individuals more interested in a political career than sharing an ideological stance or political platform. Fujimori’s Cambio 90 is paradigmatic of this trend dominating the 1990s, displacing traditional political parties from the electoral scene. See, among others, Tanaka 1998; Conaghan 2000; Levitsky and Cameron 2001, and Tanaka 2002.
13. One member of the *Jurado Nacional de Elecciones* (Electoral Tribunal) even wrote a discordant opinion on the results of the process, calling for its annulment because of the proven existence of fraud. In Rospigliosi 1995, 327.

14. The single electoral district provided for parties to each present a unique list of candidates corresponding to a nation-wide “district,” among which all the Congress members are to be elected by the whole electorate.

15. Fujimori won with 64.4 percent of the vote in the first round. Yet 40.8 percent of the ballots for the legislative elections were declared null. This and other problems related to vote count generated a lot of confusion and a lack of trust in the electoral process. See, among others, Schmidt 1999.

16. For a detailed account of the 2000 elections, see among others Transparencia 2000b.

17. The OAS General Assembly meeting held in Windsor, Canada, in June 2000 adopted a resolution creating a high-level mission to Peru led by Canada’s Foreign Affairs Minister, which made a series of requirements on the Fujimori regime to be complied with in the following months under the authority of a “Mesa de diálogo” (Dialogue Group) where opposition and civil society representatives had a strong voice.

18. Cotler and Grompone recall that the support of the CIA to Montesinos and Fujimori’s government ended when these made the mistake of lying to public opinion about a supposed arms traffic between Jordanian and Colombian guerrillas that the Peruvian army allegedly unmasked. Following this announcement at a press conference, the Jordanian government denied and claimed that in fact the arms had been sold to the Peruvian army with the agreement of the U.S. government. The end of U.S. support probably prompted greater divisions within the regime. In Cotler and Grompone 2000, 69–70. See also Cameron 2006.

19. The more critical stance found some echo in the more recent North American literature as well. Levitsky and Way proposed the notion of “competitive authoritarianism” to describe the hybrid regimes like Fujimori’s (Levitsky and Way 2002). This contrasts with previous efforts at characterizing it as a limited or partial form of democratic regime. Competitive authoritarian regimes differ from authoritarian regimes because of the continued functioning of formal democratic institutions. They differ from limited forms of democratic rule where violations of the minimum criteria defining democracy nonetheless do not reach a level of seriousness which would “alter the level playing field between government and opposition.” Competitive authoritarian regimes are therefore characterized by frequent and serious violations of the minimum democratic standards that alter the level playing field in favor of the regime incumbents, yet the latter are incapable or unwilling to eliminate four significant arenas of democratic contestation: the electoral arena, the legislature, the judiciary, and the media. The possibility for the opposition to use these arenas in a creative fashion to challenge or weaken authoritarian rulers is seen as
the distinctive feature of competitive authoritarian regimes. See also the volume edited by Julio F. Carrión (2006) that defines Fujimori’s regime as a form of “electoral authoritarianism.”

20. Levitsky mentions that the parties that dominated electoral politics in the 1980s with around 90 percent of the vote (APRA, IU, AP, and the PPC) were reduced to around ten percent of the popular vote in the mid- to late-1990s. In Levitsky 1999, 86.

21. The numerous cases of bribery filmed by Vladimiro Montesinos, Head of Secret Services who was controlling the regime’s wide patronage networks, were later shown on public television when the regime collapsed. The videotapes included several Congress members from both opposition and government. See Degregori 2001.

22. These polls were carried out by Peruvian firms DATUM and APOYO. Only the Lima population is included in their sample. See Kenney 2004 for details.

23. The military as an institution did not have any direct interest in the implementation of this neoliberal economic program, yet as explained earlier, it was seen by some sectors as a necessary means by which to restructure the economy and reform the state. Both objectives were connected to perceived and real challenges faced by Peruvian society, of which the primary effect on the military was the intense pressure to maintain internal order in light of insurgent war and economic chaos.

24. The so-called “Fujishock” implemented in August 1990 generated price hikes, the elimination of subsidies, and major cuts in public spending. This led to an immediate increase of about 5 million of the population living under the poverty line. In Béjar 1996, 55.

25. As will be explained in Chapter 4, one of the most important women’s organizations in Lima’s popular sector neighborhoods, the collective kitchens’ movement, certainly voted en masse for Fujimori in 1990, due to women’s disillusion with the Left and the APRA (Lora 1996, 144).

26. The main such program, the Programa de Emergencia Social (Social Emergency Program), was later transformed and renamed Fondo Nacional de Compensación y Desarrollo Social (National Fund for Compensation and Social Development—FONCODES). Even if it was designed as a compensatory scheme, it remained in place until the end of Fujimori’s rule and followed through afterwards.

27. My argument characterizing Fujimori’s regime as neopopulist differs from the views of Peruvian political sociologists Lynch (1995; 1999), who emphasized an irreversible crisis of populism affecting the Peruvian political system when it emerged out of the Velasco military regime, and Cotler and Grompone (2000) who describe Fujimorismo as an authoritarian regime that is wrongly seen, according to them, as neopopulist because of its popularity among popular classes. In the North American literature, Burt (2004 and 2006) also disagrees with a broader notion of populism encompassing regimes of the likes of Fujimori’s. These dissenting views
rely on a more traditional concept of populism associating a set of redistributive economic policies with a particular mode of interest mediation through mass-based parties dominated by a charismatic leader.

Chapter 3

1. Nongovernmental organizations are legal entities recognized formally by the State and that usually sign agreements with funders to carry-out specific projects. Groups are associations of individuals who share similar objectives and/or interests. The difference in status does not, per se, indicate anything about the political or even financial power of both types of collective action.

2. Classifying women’s organizations as feminist or nonfeminist is a matter of debate and interpretation, although a few organizations can resolutely be termed feminist. Some of them use the label more explicitly than others and show greater radicalism in their discourse and agenda. The criteria used for categorizing them as feminists is whether they emphasize explicitly the goal of transforming gender relations on more equal terms in their mandate and discourse. For the purpose of this chapter, when I refer to the feminist movement, this will include organizations such as Movimiento Manuela Ramos, Centro de la Mujer Peruana Flora Tristán, DEMUS, Centro de Estudios Sociales y Publicaciones (CESIP), Incafam, Mujer y Sociedad, Aurora Vivar, CENDOC-Mujer. The feminist movement also consists of smaller organizations or associations, individual activists and thinkers, and various networks such as the Red Nacional de Promoción de la Mujer, Consorcio-Mujer, Foro-Mujer.

3. See Chapter 5 for more details.

4. See Chapter 5 for more details.

5. As explained in Chapter 4, the distancing occurred as a result of various processes.


7. Susana Villarán, Founding Member of MUDE, interview with the author, July 2000.

8. The most important was the Women’s March during the Marcha de los Cuatro Suyos organized by the opposition to rally with Presidential candidate Alejandro Toledo in July 2000.

9. This issue was raised by several NGO representatives interviewed by the author.

10. The integration of the language of human rights in feminist discourse was a global phenomenon in the early 1990s. It was reflected in the gains made at the International Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in 1993, where the global women’s movement successfully lobbied for the official recognition of “women’s rights as human rights.” See Welldon 2006.
Notes

11. This was a Latin American regional trend as described in Olea 1998 and Acosta et al. 2000.

12. This cycle included, aside from the conferences already mentioned, the World Conference on Social Development and the Habitat Conference.


16. See Chapter 5 for more details on Luisa María Cuculiza’s role in Fujimori’s second mandate.


18. See more details in Chapter 5.

19. The numerous interviews with feminist NGOs’s representatives (see list of interviews in appendix) all indicated a very high level of trust toward and appreciation of the Ombudsman’s SWRS. The priorities pursued by Rocío Villanueva’s office corresponded in great measure to the ones pursued by the feminist movement in the 1990s. Issues of domestic violence and violence against women in general, reproductive rights, women’s political participation, and a gender-sensitive analysis of the law and jurisprudence, were the four areas where most efforts were concentrated at the SWRS. See Defensoría del Pueblo 2000.


22. One of the dangers for women’s rights advocates consisted also in not wanting to side with the fierce critics of the state family planning program such as the Catholic Church and other conservative actors.

23. While the political interest of these individuals was at stake in promoting some women’s issues, this does not imply that these individuals were not convinced of the importance and validity of promoting women’s rights as such.


Chapter 4

1. In 1997, 25.4 percent of Metropolitan Lima’s population was extremely poor and 23.1 percent were poor. In 2004, 36.6 percent were extremely poor and 33.2 percent were poor (Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática—INEI Peru, available at: http://www.inei.gob.pe/Sisd/index.asp).

2. The organization of the Vaso de leche (Glass of Milk) is also an interesting case to study. Committees run by women prepare the milk from milk powder received from the Lima municipality and distribute it on a daily basis to the children and expecting or breastfeeding women of their neighborhoods. For a good overview of the movement, see García 1994.

4. The issue of the autonomy of the comedores autogestionarios is of course a matter of debate and interpretation, in light of the fact that, fundamentally speaking, they always depended to some extent on outside food staples providers (nongovernmental organizations, the Church or the State) for their functioning; moreover, the space occupied by the political advising performed by professionals from popular education centers or nongovernmental organizations, as will be described further, also conditioned the autonomy of the comedores autogestionarios.

5. Given an average family size of five persons. In Lora 1996, 33.

6. The menú is a meal sold at a very low cost for popular consumption.


15. Law no.25307 “Declares as priority national interest the work carried out by the Mothers’ Clubs, the Glass of Milk Committees, the Autonomous Collective Kitchens, the Family Kitchens, the Family Centers, the Daycare centers and other grassroots social organizations in their activities in the provision of food aid.” (my translation)


17. Law no.25307, reproduced in García 1995.

18. Interviews with former leaders of the Comisión nacional de comedores and the Federación metropolitana de comedores autogestionarios de Lima y Callao, Lima, 2001 (see list in appendix).

19. The activities of the Shining Path in Lima’s shantytowns intensified as of 1988 and remained a dominant feature of shantytown life until some months after the start of the harsher counterinsurgency strategy implemented by the Fujimori regime after the self-coup of 1992. Popular sector organizations were infiltrated by guerillas or security forces, their members
threatened, coopted or killed; numerous intimidating tactics were used including physical violence, blackmail and looting. See Palmer 1994.


21. As a “commission,” the CNC had originally been given the mandate to work for the creation of a more developed and structured organization to represent the autonomous collective kitchens. However, from the beginning of the CNC in 1986 onwards, its leaders focused much more on the consolidation of the collective kitchens movement and on a number of concrete issues.


27. Ibid.


30. Ibid.

31. As explained by Relinda Sosa, interview with the author, March 2001, and by Martha Cuentas, interview with the author, February 2001. This new orientation accompanied the de-politicization of NGO work and the greater technical expertise they were expected to deliver within the projects funded by foreign donors. Training local government leaders and assisting in the building of local capacity for the delivery of health, education, and other services became the focus of many NGOs in the 1990s.


37. This political manipulation during electoral campaigns was particularly visible during the 2000 elections, documented by many electoral observers and journalists. See, for a good summary, Transparencia 2000.


Chapter 5

1. The *Ley Orgánica de Elecciones* (Organic Law on Elections, Law no.26859) adopted in 1997 provided for a compulsory minimum of 25 percent of male and female candidates in the party lists for legislative elections. The same provision was introduced at the municipal level a few months after (*Ley de Elecciones Municipales*, Municipal Elections Law no. 26864). In 2001 this minimum was increased to 30 percent through a reform of the electoral code voted by Congress (Law no.27387, December 29, 2000). In Promujer, *El Cuarto Femenino* 3 (10), April 2001.


3. Although no nation-wide survey was available on these issues, the survey performed by the *Instituto de Estudios Peruanos* under the coordination of Cecilia Blondet showed that support for women politicians differed from one region to the other. For example, on the question whether the sex of the candidate had any importance in determining a voter’s potential support, 72 percent of the Peruvians living in Lima answered it did not have any importance, with 42 percent of people living in Huancayo (a major city in the Andes) and 58 percent living in Iquitos (a major city in the Amazon) thinking it did not have importance. But on the other hand, in Huancayo 71 percent of respondents felt that the fact of being a woman candidate influenced positively voters’ propensity to vote for that candidate, whereas in Lima it was 60 percent of the respondents and in Iquitos 55 percent. In Blondet 1999a, 13–14.

4. Yet only 50 percent of the population knew of the existence of such legislation in March 2000 when asked in the survey by Calandria.

5. The first women running at presidential elections were Mercedes Cabanillas, for the APRA, and Lourdes Flores Nano for the *Partido Popular Cristiano* (Christian Popular Party—PPC) both at the 1995 elections. The APRA got a very low percentage of the vote throughout all of the 1990s, whereas Lourdes Flores Nano dropped out of the race before election day in 1995.

6. For more on the political party system in the 1990s, see Cotler 1995b, 117–41; Grompone and Mejía 1995; Tanaka 1999; and Levitsky and Cameron 2001.

7. These observations also apply to a great extent to the party system prior to 1990. See Enrique Bernales. 1990. *Parlamento y democracia*. Lima: Constitución y Sociedad, as quoted in Klatzer 2000, 224. Matland finds
that internal party democracy is one of the key features enhancing women’s participation as candidates (Matland 1998).

8. This component of the Peruvian voting system involves the possibility for voters to select up to two candidates of their liking among the list registered by the party for which they wish to cast their ballot, independently of the position occupied by the candidates on the lists. The number of preferential votes a candidate wins determines if she or he will fill one of the seats won by his or her party.

9. Numerous reports of the civic group Transparencia, which specializes in electoral observation and civic education, have testified to the difficulties voters face in dealing with the double preferential voting system. Some do not understand that the two candidates should come from the same party list; others still do not know that they have the right to choose individual candidates aside from the president. See among others Transparencia 2000a, 1.


11. In Mujer y Política. Las mujeres en el nuevo Congreso. Han funcionado las cuotas? supplement of the daily El Comercio, August 26, 2000, 5. This analysis does not report on the women candidates that did not accede to a seat.


13. The creation of this Commission was first proposed by FORO-MUJER in their “Open Letter of FORO-MUJER to Women Candidates” during the 1995 electoral campaign. In Foro-Mujer 1995. When interviewed, Beatriz Merino mentioned that the idea of forming such a Commission occurred to her while in Beijing. Beatriz Merino, interview with the author, Lima, May 2001.


15. This obstruction and lack of respect for the legislative initiatives of opposition members was generalized and did not affect Congresswomen more than Congressmen.


17. As stated in a study of women’s participation in the 1998 municipal elections, published by the nongovernmental organization CESIP, women candidates often suffered from traditional political practices whereby positions in the lists are “sold” and depend on the party leaders’ own preferences. Moreover, women often received very demeaning comments from male candidates and were often relegated to technical tasks in the campaign, having an incredibly hard time in pushing their ideas to be included in the platforms of their respective political organizations. In CESIP 1999, 35–60.

18. Virginia Vargas, from the Centro de la Mujer Peruana Flora Tristan, ran for the House of Representatives in the Lima district, and Victoria Villanueva, from the Movimiento Manuela Ramos, ran for the Senate. Both
were nominated by their organizations, but through a nonrepresentative and nonconsensual process, and as a result did not represent their organizations officially. However once candidates, they benefited from wide support within the feminist movement. In Vargas 1989, 53–70.

19. Since the United Left was a coalition of parties, it had a flexible structure that included candidates running as independents, such as the two feminist leaders who ran in the 1985 elections.

20. These organizations were: *Aurora Vivar, CENDOC-Mujer, CESIP, Centro de la Mujer Peruana Flora Tristan, Mujer y Sociedad*, and the *Movimiento Manuela Ramos*.


23. Ana-Maria Yañez, Coordinator of the Political Participation and Leadership Program at the NGO Movimiento Manuela Ramos, argued that in the period from 1995 to June 1999, thirty laws were approved that directly or indirectly referred to women’s status or rights. She added: “We believe that this is due, in great measure, to the role of Congresswomen who have opened channels of participation for civil society, in particular through the Commission on Women, and insodosingly have collected the demands and necessities of women and converted them into binding legal norms” (my translation). In Promujer, *El Cuarto Femenino* 1 (4) June 1999: 3.


27. The contradictions and difficulties this situation generated for women’s NGOs are discussed in Chapter 3.


30. As reported in the article “Qué le pasó a la Cuculiza?” published in Lima’s weekly Caretas available online: http://www.caretas.com.pe/1999/1590/Cuculiza/cuculiza.htm

31. For other interesting cases of women’s political conservatism in the region, see Kampwirth and Gonzalez 2001 and Power 2002.

32. This project was funded by USAID right after the former coordinator of Movimiento Manuela Ramos, the leading member organization behind *Promujer*, was hired by USAID as key program coordinator (although she claimed not to have been part of the project approval process). Violeta Bermúdez, interview with the author, May 2001.

33. The “Mesa directiva” of the Congress is a body made up of four Congressmembers officially elected by Congress to organize the work of the institution and structure its legislative agenda.

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