4. PRactical Emotions in the Processes of Learning

Introduction

Whether formalised in curricula or not, experiences of topics and practices being valuable and meaningful, understood in sufficiently broad terms, are of vital importance to learning processes, almost no matter what the specific content and context is. Arguably, such experiences are important in their own right (Engelsen, 2013, 2017 forthcoming; Tiberius, 2008) and thus as learning objectives in themselves, but moreover they are of central importance as a means to promoting intrinsic motivation that is vital in many processes of learning (Amabile, 1985).

With this background, the stimulation of such experiences in learners becomes central to teaching. In this chapter, I analyse how emotions fit into this picture from the point of view of the teacher as well as the student. I analyse students’ experiences of intrinsic motivation and meaningfulness and I address the role of the teacher’s own emotions in being sensitive to such student experiences. By applying basic points in philosophical and psychological theories of emotion to a phenomenological investigation of value experience, the chapter investigates the significance to processes of teaching and learning of the way emotions function and dysfunction.

I first present what I take to be a promising theory of emotions, explaining central ways in which emotions are often dysfunctional with respect to cognition, but also have important cognitive functions, in particular with regards to the apprehension of value (1). Emotional life is then taken into account in a student perspective. I investigate how students’ emotional life can constitute experiences of meaningfulness as well as motivation. This makes certain emotions important means for learning, but at the same time, they can also be argued to be aims in their own right (2). Applying the theory of the relation between value experience and emotions to the study of intrinsic motivation and meaningfulness, without losing sight of the potentially cognition-distorting nature of emotions, I then argue that teachers’ other-directed emotions can serve the function of becoming sensitive to students’ intrinsic motivation and experiences of sense-making (3). The presented theory of emotional awareness lays the ground for concluding that emotional maturity is an important part of successful teaching, in the sense of having a well-developed aptitude for context-sensitive emotion regulation, together with a meta-cognitive awareness of one’s emotional dispositions, and an awareness of the importance of facilitating certain types of emotional experiences that are crucial to students’ motivation and meaning-making (4).

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EMOTIONAL DISTORTION AND EMOTIONAL AWARENESS

Emotional experiences are vital sources of motivation of our actions, but there are good reasons for taking a stronger thesis seriously as well, namely that emotional life is a crucial source of relevant information. Recent research on emotions, value and practical capacities (Roeser, 2011; Tappolet, 2012) follow classic phenomenologists (Husserl, 1952; Scheler, 2007) in suggesting necessary connections between having certain emotions and the apprehension of value information. At the same time, emotions are infamously known for standing in the way of rational thought, reasoning and decision-making. It is fairly easy to provide proto-typical examples of emotions which evidently often distort cognition and reasoning, something also evidenced in empirical research (Haidt, 2001). Negative emotions, such as hatred, anxiety, annoyance and jealousy, can obviously stand in the way of seeing things clearly. But also positive emotions, such as love and hope, can be meaningfully said at times to ‘blind’ the person being affected.

With this background, an ambiguous picture of the relation between emotions and cognition emerges, and closer analyses of what distinguishes cognition-conducive emotional life from emotions that distort our cognitive processes are called for, not least in the context of learning (Fiedler, 2014). As we shall see, this distinction should not to be analysed in terms of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ types of emotion per se, but rather in terms of the way in which emotional life shapes attention.

How does it more precisely make sense to talk of emotions as being possible sources of information and cognition relevant to learning? A first step is to recognise that just as our emotional life motivates our actions, so does it influence our awareness. When I feel that something is X, it is not merely the case that I am inclined to act in a certain way, but my attention is also drawn towards X. For instance, if I fear that my students have not prepared for class properly, my attention is automatically drawn towards this probability.

A second step is to recognise that emotions can often be correct or incorrect. This must be properly understood of course: The point is not to say that people are wrong, in a blameworthy sense, in feeling a particular way when they have a so-called ‘wrong emotion’. Blameworthiness seems to presuppose some level of autonomous control, which is not always the case in emotional life. ‘Correct’ and ‘incorrect’ emotions must be understood here in an epistemic sense:

The main point is that emotions are often intentional (by some definitions even by necessity) (Ferran, 2008; Goldie, 2002). In and through experiencing an emotion, something is presented to the subject, and such presentation can be more or less in correspondence with the facts. My intensely felt worry, for instance, that my students have not prepared for class properly, is epistemically incorrect, insofar as they are in fact generally well-prepared, or if it poses no real problem that they are not prepared; basically, it is epistemically incorrect, if there is really nothing to worry about. On the other hand, the emotion can arguably itself be a main source of my awareness, insofar as it is well-grounded and given that it is the mental state in which I in fact
present the matter. This is an important point in the context of addressing emotions in learning activities and a point worthy of further clarification.

Firstly, a note on terminology is called for: by ‘emotion’, I understand in the following any feeling that is intentional (and thus ‘cognitive’) in the above sense of being presentational of something. Whether all feelings are presentational is controversial and not a question that is essential to answer in the present context. Often, intentional emotions are distinguished from moods and mere feelings by exactly pointing to the fact that the latter are not presentational, at least not in the sense of presenting distinct objects. To illustrate this, my above-mentioned worry is clearly a worry about something, but is my bad mood, or the itchy feeling on my back, directed at anything in particular? It is beyond the scope of this chapter to go into this discussion, and I shall address only emotions that are intentional.

In order to analyse how emotions can be said to be ‘cognitive’ in a sense relevant to learning, in the following I sketch the basic elements of what I take to be the most viable theory of emotion, what can be labelled a phenomenologically-informed appraisal theory of emotion. I draw the contours of the basic aspects of an emotion, including its presentational and valuational components.

Commonly experienced emotions, such as happiness, hatred, shame, compassion, sorrow, fear, pride, worry and resentment, can be reconstructed phenomenologically as complex Gestalt phenomena. That is, as phenomena experienced as wholes or unities, yet constituted by a complex of distinguishable elements, the united composition of which forms a unique totality. This whole cannot be reduced to the sum of its parts, and its parts cannot be adequately grasped separately from each other. The components of what is experienced in episodes of emotion are more precisely only abstract parts – in phenomenological parlance: ‘moments’ (Smith, 1983) – of the whole emotional experience. An experienced emotion can be analysed as being composed of three basic structural parts (Engelsen, 2016; Ferran, 2008; Roseman, 2001):

Basic structure of experienced emotion:

1. Doxastic information
2. Axiological information
3. Affective response

In this scenario, experiencing an emotion is basically characterised by having an affective response in and through something being experienced as negative or positive (Engelsen, 2017 forthcoming; Husserl, 1950 §37). The arrows in the
model indicate a relation of foundation: This means that in an emotion, no affective response occurs without an appearance of something that is worthy of such an emotion, i.e. without a value appearance in a basic phenomenological sense (soon to be defined more clearly), and an appearance of value in an emotion is always an appearance of something being valuable. More specifically, an emotional event includes an appearance of something being the case, i.e. basic doxastic information (1). This simply means that something is being presented about which there is the emotion. The emotion is characterised by intentionality: Being directed at something different from itself, an object – whether concrete or abstract, whether inanimate or living – is presented to the individual in and through the emotional experience. An emotion is thus not merely a non-cognitive reaction to stimuli, but is itself a presentation of something. An emotion can take the form of a distinct propositional belief, or it can be a presentation of a simpler kind, i.e. potentially belief-forming information given in non-propositional experience. The doxastic information can have various sources, e.g. sense perception, memory or imagination. An emotion of fear, for instance, can be directed at various objects in a variety of ways. Whether I perceive X, remember X, hear from others that X, or imagine that X is likely to be, X can be the object of my attention in an emotional mode of presentation.

The second structural part, the axiological information (2) is the evaluation or ‘appraisal’ aspect of the emotion: Emotions never present value-neutral objects, but are always directed at things appearing to be of positive and/or negative value. Regardless of ontological worries about the existence or relativity of value, this point is a basic explanandum to any explanation of valuating praxis: We experience things in the world, not as neutral in relation to the lives we lead, but as being of positive and negative value. Importantly, ‘value’ must be understood here in very broad terms: Anything experienced by the subject as significant and meaningful in any positive and/or negative way, whether in a self- or other-regarding sense and whether intrinsically or instrumentally, counts as being an appearance of value in this understanding of the term. To give an example, worrying about my students’ lack of preparation and what this does to their learning and my teaching, I do not interpret the situation as neutral: This situation appears negative, first and foremost with regard to the students’ learning.

The third structural aspect of an emotion is the affective response (3). This component is that aspect of the experienced emotion which is felt by the subject in a certain positive or negative way. Put differently, the affective response is itself a valenced – i.e. positive or negative – reaction to what is being experienced as being of value, positive or negative. Such valence is felt as more or less intense, corresponding to how strong the emotion is, and often (but not by necessity) corresponding to how positive or negative something is valuated to be. Worrying that my students have not prepared, I have a negative feeling about this assumed fact. There is a certain negative way it is like to feel this worry; even if it is not very intense it is nevertheless a distinct feeling. Often (if not always), the affective
response of emotion takes the form of a physical experience, an arousal, constituted by various bodily experiences depending on the emotion type, e.g. stomach-ache, sweating, blood rushing to the head and other parts of the body, an ‘uplifted’ physique, ‘chilling’ or ‘warm’ feelings, the heart pumping, ‘chills’ down the neck, goose pimples, nausea and so forth.

The term ‘emotion’ can sometimes be used to denote solely the affectual aspect of emotional experience. An important phenomenological point, however, is that if we are to properly understand what an emotion is, it makes no sense to abstract (3) from (1) and (2): As mentioned earlier, the relation (1) → (2) → (3) in the presented model is a relation of foundation: The arrows indicate a point about the causal connection between modes of experience, but since there is no way to properly understand the affectual response in complete abstraction from the connection to the other modes of experience, the relation is not merely causal, but is also constitutive. Put differently, since the causal connection is arguably necessary – i.e. if you experience an affectual response connected with an intentional emotion, by necessity it is connected with a specific doxastic and axiological phenomenal content – the connection is an ontological one. The affection is precisely by necessity a response to an interpretation of a given situation, comprised at least of the other two components (which notably can have very complex social and individual causes, distinguishable from the phenomenon itself), and its meaning can only be adequately understood in light of these. As mentioned, when having an emotion, the experiencing subject experiences all three structural parts as one totality, and to reduce emotional life to the element of the affective response is an abstraction from the original mode of experience of emotions.

To say that emotions are ‘cognitive’ with the background of the above model of emotion might be misleading, due to the vagueness of this term. If, for example, ‘cognitive’ mental states are meant to refer to propositional states, distinct beliefs and judgments, or the like, emotions can hardly be said to hold this property necessarily, since aspects (1) and (2) can arguably exemplify non-propositional modes of presentation: Emotions can be indistinct and are not immediately comparable to clear thoughts. Some emotions occur in the ‘periphery’ of attention, meaning that they are a part of experience, but the person feeling them has no thematic focus on them. Just like hearing a sound can be the audible appearance of a buzzing tone that one does not become aware of until it has gone, an emotion can be vague and unattended to as it is experienced, and perhaps only distinctly recognised when looking back on a prior event of experience and reconstructing it: “Oh, I see now that I was worried, but I was too caught up in other stuff to take notice of it at the time”.

Importantly in the present context, the affective response is conditioned by an experience of the situation as providing doxastic and axiological information, but in turn the response typically brings the mind to attend to such information, in particular (but not exclusively) to the axiological information parts (Engelsen, 2016; Ferran, 2008; Roseman, 2001):
Basic structure of experienced emotion:

1. Doxastic information
2. Axiological information
3. Affective response

The more intensely a given affective response is felt (3), the more it tends to prompt the person feeling them to pay attention to the value appearance (2), but certainly also typically to what is valued (1). The more I fear something, the more I tend to pay attention to the negative aspects of what I fear; the stronger the joyful affection of my emotion is, the more I am prompted to attend to the good things about which I feel joy. The point that emotions and value sensitivity coincide in this way and that the affective response prompts value attention is important, since it implies that in and through emotional life, we are able to present value information. In the case of (contingently or necessarily) other-directed emotions such as compassion, sympathy or gratitude, or negative emotions such as jealousy, indignation or worry, value content is given. This means that such other-directed emotions can be a person’s de facto main sources of information about what has value in the eyes of others, information that is arguably vital in most teaching situations.

Emotions are certainly not always epistemically fruitful, as is well known: With the background of the presented model of emotion, we can also make sense of and explain a central aspect of the way in which emotions can distort one’s cognitive abilities in learning environments. As mentioned, the more intensely an affective response is felt, the more prompted the mind is to pay attention to the value appearance (cf. 2) of the emotional experience. In the case of a very strong emotional response, it is psychologically difficult, in some cases perhaps even practically impossible, to attend at all to other things. A way to describe the negative impact on one’s cognitive awareness in such a case is that the emotion creates a restricted and narrow focus of attention. I can be ‘caught up’ in my joy, fear or worry, i.e. I can get very narrowly and exclusively focused on that which appears joyful, fearful or worrisome. Paying attention to other things and considering things in a wider perspective becomes neglected as a result, and cognitive processes in need of such a perspective – e.g. many processes of practical reasoning – are distorted.

But, however fallible and otherwise problematic emotional experience can be, it can still constitute genuine awareness, since without it one might not be sensitive to vital information in the situation at all (Engelsen, 2017 forthcoming). Emotions
are in this respect more akin to perception than cognition proper (Ferran, 2008): Just like, for example, a visual impression can be so strong that it blinds me from seeing anything else (suppose a very strong beam of light is suddenly directed at me), it would be wrong to say that I receive no information from my visual experience in such a case. What the impression does in this case is precisely to prevent me from receiving other sensory information due to the intensity of the impression. In parallel, my perspective can be distorted by, for example, my joyful experience that two students are having a meaningful discussion, given that it might prevent me from paying attention to the fact that the rest of the class is not learning anything in the situation, but that does not prevent my emotion of joy from being a main source of my awareness of what, from an isolated perspective, is something worthy of joy, namely the students’ meaningful debate.

In general, other-directed emotions can be argued to be important in many learning contexts involving teacher-student relations. Other-directed joy is a prototypical example of an emotion often exemplifying genuine emotional awareness, which leads to emotions generally having important functions in many learning contexts. Such other-directed emotional experience is arguably often a good means for apprehending the importance of another person’s feelings and perspective in a situation, which is crucial in teacher-student relations.

Let me illustrate this once again in a learning context: Without giving any thought to my worry about the students’ lack of preparation for class, this emotion nevertheless forms part of my ‘peripheral’ experience, and as such it is shaping my attention, motivating me to act in certain ways and, importantly, prompting me to attend to certain things. Suppose I am being very cautious about how to present the topic of the day; I am perhaps attending minutely to how the students participate in class and present their inputs in communication, and I anticipate how little they are learning from our dialogue, as well as considering what to do about the problem. Such attention to specific details of the situation could be a result (at least in part) of my worry that is lurking in the back of my mind. The more worried I feel, the more I tend to address the object(s) of the worry.

We shall soon return to the analysis of this function of emotions shaping attention in a teaching context. Before that, however, I will turn to the student perspective and the analysis of the constructive role that emotional experience can play as an important means for student learning.

**EMOTIONS AS A MEANS FOR STUDENT MEANING-MAKING AND MOTIVATION**

Emotions can be an important means for student learning due to their function of being sources of meaningfulness and motivation in a learning environment: At the most basic level of experience of value and meaningfulness, conscious emotions can be argued to be fundamental, since occurring emotions and feelings of value from a phenomenological perspective can be reconstructed as constitutive of the formation
of the very meaning of something being intrinsically valuable to the experiencing subject. Husserl describes value apprehension in experiences of feeling as a ‘taking-as-value’ (German: Wert-nehmung) (Husserl, 1952§4). With the German terminology, he emphasises an analogy between basic value comprehension and sense-perception, Wahr-nehmung, a ‘taking-as-true’. The main point is that we seem to present value in emotional experience in a non-inferential and direct way, analogous to the way we present things directly through ordinary perception, not least in contexts of self-regarding value being given in experience. This is arguably the case due to intentional feeling being the original mode of presentation of value and normative meaning as such (Engelsen, 2017 forthcoming), in parallel to, for example, visual sensation being the original mode of presentation of colour. The formation of complex intentional objects of value can be argued to be conditioned by (perhaps internalised) phenomenal content, which is originally disclosed only in specific feelings, in a way parallel to the fact that representing coloured objects is arguably conditioned by having (had) basic visual experiences of prime colours (Husserl, 1999§16; Jackson, 1986, pp. 291–295).

In short, you need to have (had) certain lived-experiences of feeling in order to make sense of the basic meaning of value. As mentioned earlier, emotional responses connected with such emotions as joy, fear, love, surprise, disgust and curiosity are all valenced experiences, and it is arguably necessary to undergo them in order to adequately grasp the corresponding value concepts (the fearful, joyful, etc.), on the basis of which value judgments are formed.

Meaning-making experiences and intrinsic motivation are closely connected with value experience in the phenomenological sense. An important structural aspect of value experience is that something is appearing itself to provide the experiencing subject with a reason for acting in certain ways: Feeling something to be in itself positive entails that it is experienced as being itself significant and reason-providing (Engelsen, 2013, pp. 54–56; Parfit, 2011). Phenomenologically, the appearance of such reason-giving quality is in accordance with something appearing to be intrinsically motivating, i.e. motivating not as a means to an external goal, but as an aim in itself. Meaningfulness experienced in a context of learning (Shuman, 2014) is an experience of something being a sensible learning objective or learning activity, whether as a means or in its own right. When something connected with learning is experienced as being of intrinsic value, it is thus also a case of meaning-making and at the same time intrinsically motivating.

Interestingly in the context of value experience in learning contexts, students’ intrinsically motivating meaning-making experiences often involve ‘seeing the positive in the negative’. Learning can for instance be hard work and at times incorporate experiences such as frustration, but it can also, and even at the same time, be given emotionally as rewarding, fulfilling, eye-opening (e.g. an ‘aha moment’, a sudden insight or inspiration), uplifting, something manageable and empowering (Fiedler, 2014, pp. 43–44) and perhaps even be felt as promising in relation to future projects. Another interesting aspect of the experience of meaningfulness in processes of learning is that in and through experiencing it, the student’s attention is
often absorbed in the subject matter at hand. This is clear in cases of flow experience in learning processes (Csikszentmihalyi, 2003), often a source of emotionally strong meaning-making episodes. Consider the case where two students are completely absorbed in their discussion of the right interpretation of a movie. Their sense of themselves and of time and place is not in focus at all; on the contrary, their learning is experienced as *itself* meaningful in and through a focus away from themselves, away from what they are doing and from the context they are doing it in, and onto the movie as something of interest in its own right: Their process of interpretation derives its experienced meaningfulness from the fact that their subject matter at hand – as opposed to external considerations in relation to it – is itself appearing to them as intrinsically valuable and reason-providing in and through their presentation of the matter in emotional modes of presentation.

Experiencing meaningfulness in processes of learning is a topic worthy of much more extensive phenomenological analysis. Having established how emotions can generally enable awareness to value and how emotional experiences can themselves exemplify and be a means to meaningful learning experiences in a student perspective, in the following I turn my focus to the teacher perspective. I investigate how emotions, when appropriately regulated, can help teachers facilitate their sensitivity towards what is experienced by students as meaningful and motivating learning.

**EMOTIONS AS A MEANS FOR THE TEACHER’S SENSITIVITY**

The importance in many learning environments of the teacher being sensitive to students’ perspectives can hardly be overstated. From the theory of the relation between emotion and awareness presented above, it follows that having certain emotions and being sensitive to things as being of value are intimately connected. Importantly, as mentioned, such emotional sensitivity arguably includes being sensitive to value regarding others.

Emotional experiences are often the very means by which we understand others. Whether we feel sadness, joy, rage, love, curiosity, contempt or sympathy in our understanding of other persons, in and through such other-directed emotions we present features of their situation more or less correctly: Following the model of the structure of emotion above, intimately connected with having a certain affective response (cf. 3), another person’s inner states can be presented (cf. 1) as being positive or negative in a certain way (cf. 2), and the affective response prompts the feeling subject to attend specifically to the value presented. The perspective of others is important in this connection. Presentation through other-directed emotions includes a possible sensitivity to what is positive and/or negative in a specific other-regarding sense. In the context of learning, we can highlight the two important functions of other-directed, emotional value-sensitivity based on this background, namely that teacher emotions can be a means for becoming aware of students’ motivation, as well as their meaning-making as described above. Let me illustrate the point by further developing the case of the students interpreting a movie:
As a movie is discussed in class, Teacher T feels a strong joy about the fact that Students S1 and S2 are completely caught up in their joint analysis of the movie, even though the content of the debate itself strikes T to be trivial, and even though the movie seems to her to be boring. It is the very fact that this debate is rich and valuable to S1 and S2 that T comprehends in her feeling joy; the fact that T recognises the value not as a value to her specifically, but as a value as seen from their perspective, makes it no less a value experience to T. It makes it an other-regarding value experience. Through her emotion of joy, the debate basically appears to T to have value for S1 and S2, and thereby a complex value-Gestalt is presented in T’s experience, which notably includes an approximation to important aspects of the students’ perspectives. In and through feeling the emotion of joy about the students’ commitment, positive aspects of the situation as such are appreciated. This can include anticipation of the positive outcomes of the students’ commitment in a learning perspective, but notably can also imply something more basic, namely an approximation to how this situation is experienced from the point of view of S1 and S2:

In other words, T’s joy involves an empathetic identification with the students, given that T’s joy implies a perspective-taking, and this includes (if successful and correct) a case of other-directed understanding. It entails that she can recognise the experienced intrinsic value, as seen from the students’ perspective, as important in its own right, i.e. the value as such of being in a state like that of S1 and S2 (Engelsen, 2013, p. 241; Klawonn, 2004, 2007; Zahavi, 1999). A structural part of feeling something to be in itself positive is that it is experienced as being itself significant and its own reason (Engelsen, 2013, pp. 54–56; Parfit, 2011). Put differently: Aside from having important potential instrumental educational effects, being in the flow of joint learning about how to analyse the movie – conceiving it from different interpretative angles, identifying with the protagonists, dissecting the story plot, appreciating the aesthetic effects, etc. – is experienced by S1 and S2 as an aim in itself, i.e. as intrinsically meaningful as well as motivating. This is recognised by T in and through her joyful emotion approximating to the students’ perspective, notably without T making the same sense of the movie and the discussion first-personally as the students do, yet in an affective (i.e. joyous) mode of presentation she nevertheless recognises the situation as being of other-regarding value. This is consistent with a response-dependent account of value suggesting that the value of objects and states of affair are dependent for their existence on certain types of human responses, and that the apprehension of the value of objects must therefore include an apprehension of such responses (Engelsen, 2013; Wiggins, 1987).

The process of interpreting the movie is experienced by the students as intrinsically interesting, and the basic point is that the teacher recognises this fact in and through enjoying the situation. Thus, for T, experiencing an emotion of joy is in this case the very means by which she comprehends the fact that the students are intrinsically motivated and involved in meaning-making learning. Given the structure of emotion, the joy of the teacher is not a mere arbitrary affective reaction; the affective response of joy is a response to and a prompting of attention to an appearance of value given
as regarding the students, and the emotional state of joy instantiates an awareness of
the fact that this learning process is motivating and a case of meaning-making for the
students.

Aside from joy, such emotions as compassion, sympathy, curiosity, enthusiasm
and passion would arguably be proto-typical examples of emotions that are often
important means for apprehending meaning-making and intrinsic motivation
in learning contexts. But we should not rule out a priori the relevance of any
emotions (even negative ones) to value sensitivity in learning contexts, since if the
phenomenologically-informed appraisal model of emotion is correct, any emotion is
a potential source of relevant information.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

It is important not to jump to hasty conclusions about the practical consequences of the
above analysis. Firstly, it does not follow from the analysis that it is a priori impossible
for a teacher to apprehend students’ intrinsic motivation or meaning-making in non-
emotional modes of presentation. In that respect, the point is rather a more defensive
one: We should not neglect the constructive importance of emotions as possible means
for awareness. Secondly, we should certainly not jump to the conclusion either that for
the aim of promoting meaningfulness and motivation in learning environments, teachers
and students should generally focus on being as emotional as possible. Emphasising
how emotions can serve crucial functions in being sensitive to intrinsic motivation and
meaning-making should not, of course, blind us to the deeply problematic nature of
many emotions in many learning contexts. As mentioned, being absorbed in emotions
in inappropriate contexts can result in the distortion of attention, e.g. in the sense of
resulting in an inability to see things in a wider perspective.

The lesson is rather one of highlighting the importance of making room for
appropriate student emotions that are conducive to meaning-making and motivation
in the learning environment, and for cultivating emotional maturity in teachers. Such
emotional maturity includes being open to various types of emotion, corresponding
to being able to attend to different forms of value information, meaning-making
and motivation in students, and it implies an aptitude for regulating the intensity of
one’s own emotions, not just in the sense of being able to down-regulate affective
responses, to ‘keep one’s cool’ in order to think and act rationally when needed,
but also in the sense of having the context-sensitive ability to up-regulate emotions
when appropriate (Engelsen, 2016; Tiberius, 2008). Such an emotion-regulation
skill further requires the teacher’s meta-cognitive ability to monitor her own
emotional dispositions, as well as a context-sensitive awareness of how certain
emotions are appropriate in different learning situations and how others are not.
These are all relevant topics for further investigation. The promotion of emotional
awareness is important, not just for such purposes as making sense of being a
student or a teacher, or avoiding burn-out etc., but as an important teaching and
learning tool in itself.
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Søren Engelsen

*Department for the Study of Culture*

*University of Southern Denmark*